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1 Introduction
The Internet consists of a number of sub-networks that are not necessarily seam-
lessly connected. Thus, the customers’ willingness to pay for being connected to
a particular sub-network depends both on this network’s intrinsic quality and on
the interconnection quality with other sub-networks. The interconnection quality
may therefore become an important strategic variable for competing firms that each
control one sub-network. If rational consumers expect that one network for some
reason will be larger than another, the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985)
shows that the owner of the larger network will have lower incentives to improve the
interconnection quality than has the owner of the small network. The reason for
this is that there will de facto be a quality differentiation between the two networks
that favors the large network if the interconnection quality is poor.
Firms within the Internet and the telecommunication industry normally have
installed bases of customers that they serve at the same time as they compete over
new customers. A hot topic has been whether a firm with a relatively large installed
base has incentives to degrade the interconnection quality towards its smaller rivals.
This issue was raised during the AOL-Time Warner merger and the MCI-WorldCom
merger.3
Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) use a modified version of the Katz and Shapiro
(1985) model to analyze a dominant firm’s incentives to degrade quality to rival
firms. They assume that the merged firm will be in possession of a relatively large
base of installed customers, and demonstrate how this may give the firm an incentive
to reduce the interconnection quality towards a smaller rival. Furthermore, they
show that the large firm’s incentive to maintain a high interconnection quality is
decreasing in the size difference between the installed bases of the two firms.
3Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) and Crémer et al. (2000) analyze this question for the AOL/Time-
Warner merger and the MCI/WorldCommerger, respectively, while Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2002)
analyze the interplay between telecommunication incumbents, global IBPs and regional ISPs. The
Internet backbone market is also analyzed by Besen et al. (2001), Milgrom et al. (2000), and
Laffont et al. (2001a, 2001b). A recent overview of the market structure and regulation of the
Internet is given by Cave and Mason (2001).
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Crémer et al. assume that, other things equal, the utility new customers’ get from
network subscription is increasing in the total network size and the interconnection
quality. Hence, new customers are charged a price which is increasing in the total
network size and in the interconnection quality. In contrast, the price paid by
customers in the installed bases is assumed to be fixed in their model. The main
focus in our paper is on the analysis of how interconnection incentives for large firms
are affected by changes in the revenue collected from the installed base customers.
More specifically, how does an income structure where customers in the installed
bases are being charged a price that is increasing in the total network size and in
the interconnection quality affect the interconnection incentives for the larger firm?
On the one hand, we may expect that the larger firm will have relatively strong
incentives to improve the interconnection quality, because this makes it possible to
charge higher prices from customers in its installed base. In line with this, we show
that the larger firm may be willing to set a high interconnection quality even if it
means that it captures a lower number of new customers than would be the case
with a poor interconnection quality.
On the other hand, the larger firm gains a competitive advantage if it sets a low
interconnection quality. We demonstrate that this effect is more likely to dominate
the larger the difference between the installed bases and the higher the price the
firm can charge each customer in the installed base. We further show that, for any
given interconnection quality, the total number of new customers served by the firms
depends only on the total size of the installed bases and not on whether the bases are
asymmetric in size. However, an asymmetry in the size of the installed bases may
affect the interconnection incentives, and this will in turn influence the market size.
Moreover, the smaller firm may be harmed in the competition for new customers
if there is an increase in the price that is being charged from the customers in the
installed base. The reason for this is that a high price to installed base customers
makes the larger firm more aggressive in the market for new customers.
In Crémer et al. (2000) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) the degree of vertical
differentiation between the large and the small provider is a function of the inter-
connection quality. The larger firm has a quality advantage only when the inter-
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connection quality is imperfect. In our basic model we have a similar assumption,
and analogous to Crémer et al. we assume that the interconnection quality is the
same with respect to the installed base segment and the new competitive market.
In an extension of our basic model, we in contrast assume that the interconnection
quality to the installed base is set before the interconnection quality to the com-
petitive market. Hence, the large provider needs not to reduce the interconnection
quality towards the rival’s new customers in order to have a quality advantage. We
show that in this context, we may have perfect interconnection quality in the new
market even if the interconnection quality in the installed base segment is imperfect.
Furthermore, we show that, if the interconnection quality is perfect for the installed
base customers, the larger firm always choose to set perfect interconnection quality
in the new market too.
The existence of an installed base seems realistic for the markets we have in
mind. When a firm like AOL Time Warner enters a regional market in Europe,
for instance, they compete with a regional ISP. AOL Time Warner’s customer base
in the USA may be seen as an installed base or a clientele. Obviously, AOL Time
Warner may gain a competitive advantage by offering the regional European ISP
a low interconnection quality with the customers that AOL Time Warner has in
the USA. However, it is likely that AOL Time Warner’s income from American
customers also depends on the interconnection quality with European Internet users
that are connected to regional ISPs. Typically, the revenue from the installed base
customers will be higher if there are more people with whom they can have high
quality communication. Intuitively, the gain from the installed base from a high
interconnection quality may well offset the loss due to reduced competitiveness in
the new market.
The installed base segment may also be seen as the market for the basic service,
while the new competitive segment is the market for emerging services. One exam-
ple is the question of interconnection quality (or interoperability) between AOL’s
instant-messaging service and rivals (e.g. Yahoo and Microsoft) instant-messaging
services. When firms like Yahoo and Microsoft began offering instant-messaging
AOL had a large installed base, and AOL tried to reduce the degree of intercon-
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nection towards the new rivals (see Faulhaber, 2002). In this context there seems
realistic to assume that there is one interconnection variable for the existing text-
based instant-messaging services. This variable is set before the interconnection
variable for emerging instant-messaging services (that requires broadband). As a
condition for the merger between AOL and Time Warner FCC imposed the con-
dition that AOL have to offer interconnection with other providers of advanced
instant-messaging services. However, no condition was imposed on the intercon-
nection agreements for existing text-based instant-messaging services. Faulhaber
(2002) argue that even if the interconnection quality between advanced instant-
messaging services are perfect, AOL will have an advantage from degrading the
interconnection to its large installed base. The reason is that also advanced instant-
messaging services will probably use the same directory of ”buddy lists” (Names
and Presence Directory (NPD)). Hence, as low interconnection quality for existing
text-based instant-messaging services will give AOL an advantage also in the market
for advanced instant-messaging services (even if the interconnection quality for new
services is perfect).
As another example, consider the market for broadband access to residential
users. The two main alternatives are offered by telecommunication incumbents (who
upgrade their copper network to handle DSL) and by cable-TV providers. In Eu-
rope the coverage of the telecommunication network is much larger than that of the
cable-TV networks. Hence, we have a duopoly in some regions (typically in urban
areas), while we have a monopoly controlled by the telecommunication incumbent
in other regions (rural areas). Suppose that there are strong network effects such
that the reservation price of a customer increases with the number of broadband
users and with the interconnection quality between DSL and the cable-TV network.
Since existing broadband users in rural areas have no alternative access possibili-
ties, they can be seen as an installed base or a clientele for the telecommunication
incumbent. The presence of a clientele implies that the incumbent has the ability
to create a competitive advantage over the cable-TV providers in urban areas if it
degrades the interconnection quality. The degradation may take place by reducing
the data flow capacity between the networks, such that, for instance, an interactive
4
videoconference between people in rural and urban areas is possible only if all par-
ties subscribe to the incumbent’s services. However, degrading the interconnection
quality reduces the reservation price to the customers in the monopoly area, and
this may well dominate the competition effect.4
The rest of the paper is organized at follows. First, we present the basic model.
Second, we focus on the main features of the market equilibrium for a given inter-
connection quality. Third, we analyze the incentives of a firm with a large installed
base to degrade interconnection quality towards a smaller rival. Fourth, we have an
extension of the basic model where interconnection is set independently for the in-
stalled base and the new customers, respectively. Finally, we make some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
Suppose that two firms compete in a Cournot fashion, choosing the quantities 1
and 2 simultaneously.5 Firm  has an installed base  of customers, and without
loss of generality we will assume that firm 1 possibly has a larger installed base than
firm 2, i.e., 1 ≥ 2. The installed base of firm 1 may be customers living in an area
not covered by the network of firm 2 and vice versa. The total number of installed
base customers is equal to  ≡ 1 + 2. We assume that the contracts with the
installed base customers are such that the revenue from the installed base increases
both with the number of users (the total network size) and with the interconnection
4The same feature is found in the mobile networks, where the incumbent controlling a full
coverage network may degrade the interconnection quality to smaller entrants. This will most
likely become an important topic when new firms enter the mobile market with third generation
mobile networks in Europe (UMTS).
5Crémer et al. (2000) argue that Cournot gives a realistic description of the competition in
the Internet backbone market. Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) show that the conditions in
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) are fulfilled in the broadband access market. Hence, they analyze a
capacity constrained price game as a one-stage Cournot game. Foros and Hansen (2001) analyze
the incentives to be compatible if the downstream firms compete a là Hotelling. In a model without




Let  denote the perceived quality of network  The inverse demand curve of
firm  is given by
 = 1 +  −  − 
The quality  of the service is given by:
 = 
The term  ≡  +  + 	( + ) is the quality-adjusted total network size; other
things equal, it is increasing in the interconnection quality 	 and in the total number
of new and existing customers in the two networks. The interconnection quality
between the two networks is measured by the parameter 	 ∈ [0
 1]; there is no
interconnection if 	 = 0
 and perfect interconnection if 	 = 1 The parameter  may
be interpreted as a measure of network effects; the higher the value of  the more
important is the total network size for the customers.
The equilibrium price in the competitive segment is then given by:
 = 1−  −  +  = 1 + ( + 	)− (1− ) − (1− 	)
This is analogous to Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000).
The cost of connecting one additional customer is , where  ∈ [0
 1]. Throughout
we assume that the cost of increasing the interconnection quality 	 is equal to zero.
The profit for the firms is:
 = ( − ) +  

where the last term is the profit from the installed base . More specifically, we
assume that the profit from the installed base is given by
 = () (1)
The variable  is the price that each customer in the installed base is charged by
network owner  Since we will not be focusing on the contracts that the networks
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have with customers in their installed bases, we will treat  as an exogenously given
parameter.6
Throughout we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: The equilibrium interconnection quality is equal to the level
chosen by the firm that values interconnection the least, and there are no access
prices paid for interconnection.
Assumption 2: The firms can price discriminate between new customers and
installed base customers, and the installed base customers cannot switch or resign
from a provider as a result of degraded interconnection quality or higher subscription
price.
Assumption 1 is similar to Crémer et al., and they motivate the limited possi-
bilities to charge an access price between networks in the Internet backbone market
by problems with writing complete contracts. An alternative interpretation can be
found by looking at the broadband access market and the mobile market, where
incumbents are subject to regulation that limits free determination of access prices.
Assumption 2 is realistic in contexts where firms like AOL Time Warner enter
a new country. Then the providers may price discriminate between customers in
different national markets, since the installed base customers cannot buy the service
in another country. Obviously, some installed base customers may resign when the
price is high, but that is not considered in the model since the price charged to the
installed base customers is exogenous. The installed base customers are assumed to
have positive levels of utility of being connected to the network for any permissible
prices.7 In the broadband access market discussed in the introduction the customers
living in rural district cannot switch and buy access in another area.
In the following we will consider a two-stage game. In the first stage the firms set
the interconnection quality, and in the second stage they choose quantities simul-
6In the context of broadband access  may be seen as a discounted monthly fee that depends
on the quality-adjusted network size.
7The assumption that installed base customers cannot resign or switch may be problematic if 
becomes very large, but in Assumption 3 we restrict the magnitude of  to avoid such a problem.
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taneously. We will first characterize the properties of the second stage, before we
proceed to analyze the question of whether the firms may have incentives to degrade
the interconnection quality.
2.1 Cournot competition
The first-order condition for firm  with respect to quantity gives the following
reaction function for firm :
() =
1− + ( + 	) +  − (1− 	)
2(1− ) (2)
In order to ensure stability for 	 ∈ [0
 1] we need to assume that the importance of
connectivity to new users (or the importance of the network effect) is sufficiently
small; more specifically,   12 (see assumption 3 below). Note that neither  nor
the size of the installed bases affects the slope of the reaction curves, but an increase
in  or in  shifts the reaction curve () upwards. In particular, we may end up
in a monopoly equilibrium if  or the difference (1 − 2) is sufficiently large.8
Throughout the paper we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3: We assume that   12 and  ≤ .
The first part of Assumption 3 ensures that the equilibrium is stable, as noted
above, whereas the latter part is sufficient to ensure that the smaller firm will always
produce a positive quantity in equilibrium. If  ≤ , the value to the firms of each
new customer exceeds that of each customer in the installed base. If  is sufficiently
larger than , the firms’ main focus may turn towards the installed base customers
where the larger firm has an absolute advantage. Consequently, in the latter case
we may end up in a situation where the larger firm is the sole producer.





2(1− ) + (1 + 	)
2(1− ) + (1− 	) +
(1− 	)∆1
2(1− )− (1− 	)
¶
+
2(1− )1 − (1− 	)2
4(1− )2 − (1− 	)2 
(3)
8Since  = 1+2 is fixed, a larger  implies that  is smaller. Equation (2) therefore shows






2(1− ) + (1 + 	)
2(1− ) + (1− 	) −
(1− 	)∆1
2(1− )− (1− 	)
¶
+
2(1− )2 − (1− 	) 1
4(1− )2 − (1− 	)2 
(4)
where  ≡ 1 + 2 is the total installed base, and ∆ ≡  −  (for 
  = 1
 2, and
 6= ) is the difference in installed bases of the two firms.
The first term in the bracket of equations (3) and (4) shows that both firms tend
to have a higher output the larger is the total installed bases. This simply reflects
the fact that larger installed bases make the networks more attractive for unattached
customers. However, the firm with the larger installed base will have a competitive
advantage if 	  1 Therefore, the second term in the bracket is positive for firm 1
and negative for firm 2.
The third term in equations (3) and (4) shows how the quantities depend on 
and the size of the installed bases, 1 and 2 This term is unambiguously positive
for firm 1, but is negative for firm 2 if 2(1− )2 − (1− 	) 1  0
Adding (3) and (4) we find that total quantity ∗ ≡ ∗1 + ∗2 is:
∗ =
2(1− ) + (1 + 	)
2(1− ) + (1− 	) +
2(1− )− (1− 	)
4(1− )2 − (1− 	)2 (5)
Since ∗  0
 we thus have:
Proposition 1 A larger price  charged to the installed base customers implies that
(i) the number of new customers served by the larger Firm 1 increases (∗1  0) 
(ii) the number of new customers served by the smaller Firm 2 increases if and
only if 21  ̂ ≡ (1− 	)  [2(1− )] 
(iii) the total number of new customers served by the two firms increases (∗  0) 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the incentive to increase the network
size in order to generate higher profit from the installed base is increasing in the
price  that is paid by these customers. Both firms will therefore tend to be more
aggressive in the end-user market the higher the value of  However, if the installed
base advantage of the larger firm is sufficiently pronounced, we see from equation
(4) that an increase in  actually reduces firm 2’s output, 2. In particular, for 2
close to 0 the smaller firm’s output will always decrease when  increases. This not
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only implies that the more aggressive behavior of firm 1 subsequent to an increase
in  reduces the number of new customers captured by the smaller firm; but also
that it may reduce the total profit of firm 2. This is most easily seen for 2 = 0
 in
which case 2 = (1− )22
From equation (5) we further see that
Proposition 2 For any given level of 	, the total quantity ∗ depends positively on
the total size of the installed base () and is independent of the difference in installed
bases between the firms ( − )
This result is in line with Bergstrom and Varian (1985), who show that given
certain conditions total quantity in a Cournot game is independent of the individual
agents’ characteristics.
2.1.1 The relationship between the interconnection quality and output
In order to see how improved interconnection quality affects output, we first note




2(1− ) + (3− ( − ))
(3− 2 − 	)2   0
Improved interconnection quality will thus unambiguously increase total quantity.
The reason for this is simply that an increase in 	 implies that the total quality-
adjusted network size increases, and this makes it more attractive for new customers
to connect to the networks.
To see how improved interconnection quality affects the output of each single








− ∆ (1− )
(2(1− )− (1− 	))2 +
2 (1− ) + (3− )
(2(1− ) + (1− 	))2 (6)
− ∆
(2(1− )− (1− 	))2 +

(2(1− ) + (1− 	))2
¸
The two first elements in (6) are identical to Crémer et al. (2000), whereas the
latter two elements explain how installed base profit influences the solution. Chang-
ing the quality of interconnection has the following effects on the firms’ equilibrium
outputs:
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◦The first term is the quality differentiation effect ; an improved interconnection
quality reduces the competitive advantage of the large firm. This term is negative
for firm 1 and positive for firm 2.
◦ The second term is the demand expansion effect ; an improved interconnection
quality increases all consumers’ willingness to pay. This effect is positive for both
firms, and indicates that both firms will capture a larger number of new customers
if 	 increases.
◦ The third and fourth terms are the installed base effects, which in essence
strengthen the quality differentiation effect and the demand expansion effect. On
the one hand, the presence of the installed base makes it less profitable for the larger
firm to increase the quality of interconnection when the degree of differentiation is
high, since a large ∆1 will result in a lower equilibrium output by the smaller firm
(the larger the disadvantage of the smaller firm the more negatively affected is the
smaller firm’s equilibrium output). This results in a lower profit from the installed
base, all other things equal. On the other hand, it is more profitable for the larger
firm to increase 	 when the total level of the installed base, , is large, since this
tends towards a higher output by the smaller firm.9
We can thus conclude:10
Lemma 1When the profit from the installed base depends on the quality-adjusted
network size we have that:
i) The smaller firm’s equilibrium output is increasing in the interconnection qual-
ity (∗2	 ≥ 0).
ii) The larger firm’s equilibrium output may be increasing or decreasing in the
interconnection quality (∗1	 ≶ 0).
iii) The total equilibrium output is increasing in the interconnection quality (∗	  0).
9Of course, the increase in the magnitude of the installed base can be a result of increasing only
the larger (smaller) firm’s installed base, in which case the degree of differentiation will also be
higher (lower).
10See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for ∗1 to be
negative.
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2.2 Incentives for quality degradation?
We will now analyze the firms’ incentives to increase 	. The interconnection quality
is assumed to be in the interval 	 ∈ [0
 1], which ensures that all the comparative
statics are valid for all permissible 	. The equilibrium profit may be written as:
 = (1− )(∗ )2 + ( + ∗ + 	(∗ + )) (7)
Differentiating the equilibrium profit in (7) with respect to 	 we can identify three


























The first term is similar to Crémer et al. (2000), and is the effect on the profit
from the new customers when the interconnection quality improves. This term is
positive for firm  if and only if the firm captures new customers when 	 increases.
The second and third terms relate to the installed base effect. The second term
is always positive, and is the increase in profit from firm ’s installed base when 	
increases for a given number of new and locked-in customers of firm . When the
quality of interconnection improves, the number of new customers is affected. This
will have an impact on the profit captured from the installed base, and is described
in the third term.
For the smaller firm all three terms in equation (8) are positive (see Appendix
A.2). Hence, the profit for firm 2 is increasing in 	, so that it prefers perfect inter-
connection quality. In contrast, for firm 1 we may have 1	  0 since term 1 and
term 3 in equation (8) may be negative. Consequently, given Assumption 1 it is the
larger firm’s choice of interconnection quality that determines which interconnection
quality will prevail.
In Appendix A.2 we show the profit function for firm 1 is convex in 	
 and we
have the following result:11
11If we introduce costs associated with increasing interconnection quality, we may have an interior
solution with respect to quality if these costs are convex enough. However, this does not change
our results qualitatively.
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Lemma 2 Firm 2 will always prefer to have complete interconnection quality,
while firm 1 chooses 	 = 0 or 	 = 1.
From equation (8) we see that 1	 is strictly positive if ∗1	 = 0 By
continuity, it then follows that there exists some interval where 1	 is positive
even if ∗1	  0:
Proposition 3 Assume that the profit from the installed base is affected by the
quality-adjusted network size . An improvement of the interconnection quality
may then increase the profit level of the larger firm even if its number of unattached
customers falls (i.e., ∗1	  0 even if 
∗
1	  0).
This is in contrast to the case analyzed by Crémer et al. (2000) where the profit
from the installed base is not affected by . Then ∗1	  0 is a sufficient and
necessary condition to ensure ∗1	  0
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 3 is the following: When the profit
from the installed base is no longer assumed to be constant, the installed base effect
implies that the profit from increased willingness to pay by the locked-in users will
make it less profitable to degrade the interconnection quality. In this case, improved
interconnection quality has an additional positive effect on profits, which together
with the demand expansion effect may dominate the quality differentiation effect.
The importance of the profit from the installed base, valued through , will have
an impact on the firms’ incentives to choose high quality connectivity.12 When 
increases, the profit from the installed base increases if we keep output constant.
However, the magnitude of  will also affect the equilibrium output. By differen-
tiating (6) with respect to  we find how the basic trade-off between the degree
of differentiation and the total installed base affects the marginal profitability of








((2(1− ))− (1− 	))2 +

((2(1− )) + (1− 	))2
¸
12From Lemma 2 we know that firm 2 will always prefer maximum interconnection quality, so
it suffices to examine firm 1’s incentives to choose high quality when  changes.
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We see that when the difference between the firms’ installed bases is low (i.e., for
low values of ∆1) it becomes less likely that the bigger firm will choose 	 = 0 when
 increases, while for high values of ∆1 (i.e., ∆1 close to ), it becomes more likely
that firm 1 will choose 	 = 0 when  increases. Thus, when the installed bases
of the firms are of similar sizes, the demand expansion effect (and not the quality
differentiation effect) becomes more important for the investing firms. The demand
expansion effect is positive for both firms, but the quality differentiation effect may
be negative for the larger firm. Consequently, when the difference between the
installed bases is small, the firms will want to make as much out of the demand
expansion effect as possible, which entails setting the interconnection quality as
high as possible (i.e., 	 = 1).
This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When the difference in installed base between the firms is low com-
pared to the total installed base (i.e., ∆1 low compared to ), a larger price  charged
to the installed base lowers firm 1’s incentive to degrade the interconnection quality.
In contrast, when ∆1 is close to , a large  increases firm 1’s incentive to set 	 = 0.






















from which it follows that
Proposition 5 When there is perfect interconnection 	 = 1 we have that:
(i) When the profit from the installed base is independent of the quality-adjusted
total network size  the firms will be symmetric in the market for new customers,
∗1 = 
∗
2, even if 1  2 (Crémer et al., 2000).
(ii) When the profit from the installed base depends on the quality-adjusted total
network size  the firms will be asymmetric in the market for new customers, ∗1 
∗2, also with perfect interconnection.
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The intuition behind this result is as follows: The competitive advantage stem-
ming from having a large installed base falls as the interconnectivity improves, and
the networks have the same quality when 	 = 1 However, the larger firm always
have relatively strong incentives to be aggressive in the market for new customers
if   0. This is due to the fact that this firm, at the margin, always has a higher
profit from the installed base by capturing a new customer compared to its smaller
rival. Therefore ∗1  
∗
2 even at 	 = 1 if the profit from the installed base depends
on the quality-adjusted network size.
The result in Proposition 5 is to some extent a consequence of Assumption 2,
namely that the firms can price discriminate between new customers and installed
base customers. In contrast, if the firms cannot price discriminate they will be less
aggressive in the market for new customers. The reason for this is that an aggressive
behavior (i.e., a low price) tends to reduce the income from the installed base (see
Schmalensee, 1983).
2.3 Installed base interconnection and interconnection for
new customers are set sequentially
In contrast to the basic model we now assume the following three stage game. At
stage 1 the interconnection quality with respect to the installed bases (	̂) is set. At
stage 2 the interconnection quality with respect to the new competitive market (	)
is set. Finally, at stage 3 we have Cournot competition. The the quality-adjusted
total network size is now  ≡  +  + 	̂ + 	. The qualitively results in this
section do not depend on the effect of the installed base profit. Hence, for the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the profit is  = (1− )(∗ )2.





2(1− ) + (1 + 	̂)
2(1− ) + (1− 	) +
(1− 	̂)∆
2(1− )− (1− 	)
!
(9)
Since ∗ is convex in 	, firm 1 sets 	 = 1 or 	 = 0 at stage 2. We define 		̂ as a
strategy for firm 1. For instance, if 		̂ = 10
 firm 1 sets 	 = 1 at stage 2 and 	̂ = 0
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at stage 1. The necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that firm 1 sets 	 = 1







3(1− )(3− 2) +
(1 + 	̂)





From equation (10) we have the following result:
Proposition 6 If the installed base interconnection is high (	̂ close to 1), firm 1
will set perfect interconnection quality in the new market (	 = 1)
Recall from the introduction that FCC imposed as a condition for the AOL
merger that AOL offer perfect interconnection quality for new advanced instant-
messaging services (	 = 1 in the present context), while they did not impose a
condition on the interconnection quality for existing text-based instant-messaging
(	̂ in the present context). However, from Proposition 6 we see that a firm will
ensure high interconnection quality in the new market if the interconnection quality
for the installed base is high.
We define ∆1̂−0̂1 as a critical value of ∆1 that ensure that 
1̂
1 − 0̂1 = 0. If
∆1 ≤ ∆1̂−0̂1 we have 1̂1 − 0̂1 ≥ 0, and the stage 2 equilibrium is 	∗ = 1 In
contrast, if ∆1  ∆1̂−0̂1 we have 
1̂
1 − 0̂1  0, and the stage 2 equilibrium is






2(1− ) + (1 + 	̂)
i
(11)
Since ∆1̂−0̂1 	̂  0
the term ∆
1̂−0̂
1 is lowest for 	̂ = 0 If we insert for 	̂ = 0






[2(1− ) + ] (12)
When ∆1 ≤ ∆10−001 , firm 1 sets 	∗ = 1 at stage 2 independent of 	̂ at stage 1. If
we insert for ∆1 =  into equation (12) we find that firm 1 sets 	
∗ = 1 at stage 2
for all 	̂ ∈ [0
 1] when (1− ) ≥  This result may be summarized in the following
Proposition:
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Proposition 7 For low values of , i.e.  ≤ (1− )
 firm 1 sets 	∗ = 1 at stage 2




The intuition behind this result is that for low values of , the installed base is
small compared to the new competitive market. Therefore, the degree of vertical
differentiation will be so low also when 	̂ = 0 that it is optimal to set 	 = 1.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that the incentives of an incumbent with a smaller
rival to degrade the interconnection quality depend on the total network size and
on the price charged to the installed base customers. If the price charged to the
installed base is high, and the difference between the installed bases is small, the
incumbent will have relatively strong incentives to set a high interconnection quality.
In contrast, if the incumbent has close to the entire installed base, a high price
charged to the installed base makes it more likely that the minimum interconnection
quality is chosen. Furthermore, an improvement in the interconnection quality may
increase the profit level of the larger firm even if its number of unattached customers
falls.
In the paper we have also shown that a smaller firm may be harmed if the
customers in the installed bases are being charged a high price, because this will
make the larger firmmore aggressive in the competition for new customers. However,
it should be noted that few customers are truly locked-in. Some firms may find it
profitable to enter the monopolized segment to capture the installed base customers
if the price charged by the monopolist to those customers becomes sufficiently high.
It seems reasonable to assume that the price charged to the installed base will
depend on the likelihood of new firms entering to compete for the installed base
customers. If the entry barriers in the competition for customers in the installed
base are sufficiently high, new entry is less likely and the price charged to the
installed base may be high.
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Interconnection quality will have an impact on the welfare of consumers, but
exactly how consumers’ surplus will be affected by a change in the interconnection
quality depends on the output effect of such a change. If both firms’ outputs increase
when quality increases, we can say that consumers will be better off. Consequently,
interconnection quality is likely to be an important parameter to regulators. Our
model suggests that in order to ensure a high interconnection quality a regulator
should make an effort to encourage entry into the installed base segments. This will
cancel out any asymmetry that might exist between firms in terms of the level of the
installed bases, and will make it more difficult to charge a high price in the installed
base segment.
4 Appendix
A.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for ∗1	  0





(1−  − )∆1
(1− (2− 	) )3 +
2 (1− ) + (3−  + ) 




which means that ∗1	 is more likely to be negative at 	 = 0 than at 	 = 1 In
particular, this means that a necessary condition for ∗1 to be negatively affected by
improved interconnection quality is that ∗1	|=0  0
 while a sufficient condition
is that ∗1	|=1  0





 0 if ∆1  ∆̂1 ≡ 2 (1− ) + (3−  + ) 
(3− 2)2 (1−  − ) (1− 2)
2 






 0 if ∆1  ∆̌1 ≡ 2 (1− ) + (3−  + )
9 (1−  − ) 

where we also have that ∆̌1  0 and ∆̌1  0
A.2 Convexity of the profit functions
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Differentiating the equilibrium profit, (7), with respect to interconnection quality


























By observing equation (6) we see that ∗2	 ≥ 0 whereas the sign on ∗1	 is
ambiguous, since   12 and 1 ≥ 2. Furthermore, we can show that:
∗2	 − ∗1	 = −∆1 ( −  − 1)  (1 +  (	 − 2))2 ≥ 0
Consequently, the profit function for firm 2 is always increasing in 	, and firm 2
prefers perfect interconnection quality.
For firm 1, the first term in (A.2.1) is negative if ∗1	  0. The second term





≥ 0 (see A.1) is a sufficient condition for ensuring that firm 1’s profit is
increasing in 	 for all permissible values of 	.




























To determine the sign on the second-order derivative on firm ’s profit, we need to
determine the sign of expression (A.1.1). Examining (A.1.1), we see that 2∗1	
2 ≥
0 since ∆1 ≡ 1 − 2 ≥ 0 and   12, whereas the sign on 2∗2	2 is ambiguous.
Define the difference ∆	 ≡ 2∗1	2 − 2∗2	2. It can be shown that ∆	 =
−22 (1 − 2) ( −  − 1)  ((2(1− ))− (1− 	))3 ≥ 0. Since (A.1.1) is positive
for firm 1, the conditions ∆	 ≥ 0 and 	 ≤ 1 imply that 1 is convex in 	. Hence,
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